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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CYBERsitter, LLC, aCalifornia limitedliability company
Plaintiff, v.
Google Inc., a Delawarecorporation; ContentWatch,Inc., a Utah corporation,d/b/a Net Nanny; and DOES1-10, inclusive,
Defendants.  
)))))))))))))))
CV 12-5293 RSWL(AJWx)
ORDER re: Defendant’sMotion to Transfer, orin the Alternative toDismiss Plaintiff’sState Law Claims [13]
Currently before the Court is Defendant Google
Inc.’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Transfer Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), or in the
Alternative to Dismiss Plaintiff’s State Law Claims
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) [13].  The Court having
reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to this Motion
and having considered all arguments presented to the
Court, NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS:
The Court hereby DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART
1
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Defendant’s Motion. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Action stems from a Complaint filed against
Defendant and ContentWatch, Inc. (“ContentWatch”;
collectively “Defendants”) by CYBERsitter, LLC
(“Plaintiff”), a corporation that developed, markets,
and sells an Internet content-filtering program known
as “CYBERsitter.”  The CYBERsitter program, which went
to market in 1995, has been continuously marketed and
sold to the public since that time.  Compl. ¶ 13. 
Plaintiff is the owner of trademark rights in the
CYBERsitter mark.  Id. at ¶ 16.
ContentWatch is a Utah corporation d/b/a “Net
Nanny.”  It markets and sells an Internet content-
filtering software program also known as “Net Nanny.” 
Id. at ¶ 9. 
Defendant is one of the world’s largest providers
of Internet search engine services.  A portion of
Defendant’s revenue comes from displaying sponsors’
paid advertisements on its search engine and other
Websites for which Defendant provides sponsored ads. 
Id. at ¶ 18.  In response to keyword searches on
Defendant’s search engine, sponsors’ paid advertising
results called “sponsored links” are displayed with
other search results.  Id.
In or about 2000, Defendant launched a paid
advertising program known as the “AdWords” program,
which allows sponsors to purchase certain keywords that
2
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trigger the sponsor’s advertisement whenever a user
conducts online searches through Defendant’s search
engine using those keywords.  Id. at ¶ 20.  In the
early 2000s, Plaintiff, d/b/a Solid Oak Software,
signed up online for an AdWords account in order to
advertise the CYBERsitter program on Defendant’s
AdWords platform.  Milburn Decl. ¶ 5.  In connection
with the AdWords account, CYBERsitter’s president,
Brian Milburn, was presented with a clickwrap agreement1
in 2006 entitled “Google Inc. Advertising Program
Terms” (“Agreement”).  Id. at ¶ 6.  In relevant part,
the opening paragraph of the Agreement reads:
These Google Inc. Advertising Program Terms
(“Terms”) are entered into by, as applicable,
the customer signing these Terms . . . or that
accepts these Terms electronically (“Customer”)
and Google Inc. (“Google”).  These Terms govern
Customer’s participation in Google’s
advertising program(s) (“Program”) . . . . 
These Terms . . . are collectively referred to
as the “Agreement.”
Opp’n 5:7-9 (bold in original).
In addition, the Agreement includes “miscellaneous”
terms that, inter alia, provide:
 Clickwrap agreements are online agreements that “require a user1
to affirmatively click a box on the website acknowledging
awareness of and agreement to the terms of service before he or
she is allowed to proceed with further utilization of the
website.”  U.S. v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.2 (C.D. Cal.
2009).
3
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ALL CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS
AGREEMENT OR THE GOOGLE PROGRAM(S) SHALL BE
LITIGATED EXCLUSIVELY IN THE FEDERAL OR STATE
COURTS OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, USA,
AND GOOGLE AND CUSTOMER CONSENT TO PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN THOSE COURTS.
Mot. 2:14-18 (caps in original).
According to Mr. Milburn, he has not run any paid
advertising for the CYBERsitter program though
Defendant’s AdWords program since December 2010. 
Milburn Decl. ¶ 6.
Plaintiff alleges that “[e]arlier this year,” Mr.
Milburn learned that Defendants, as part of the Google
AdWords platform, were running paid advertisements for
ContentWatch’s Net Nanny program, which included the
CYBERsitter trademark in them.  Compl. ¶ 27. 
Additionally, when an Internet user would search on the
Google search engine for “CYBERsitter,” or similar
terms, ContentWatch’s advertisements with the
CYBERsitter trademark would be displayed, often as the
first result in the user’s search.  Id.  CYBERsitter
has never authorized Defendant, Net Nanny, or any other
party to use the CYBERsitter mark in connection with
ContentWatch’s advertisements.  Id. at ¶ 27.
As a result, on June 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed a
Complaint against both Defendants, charging them with
trademark infringement, false advertising, unfair
competition, and unjust enrichment.  The Complaint
4
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specifically alleges that Defendant Google has violated
various federal and California laws by (1) selling the
right to use Plaintiff’s CYBERsitter trademark to
ContentWatch, which in turn illegally uses the
trademark in its online advertisements through
Defendant’s advertising program, and (2) permitting and
encouraging ContentWatch’s use of “CYBERsitter” in its
online advertisements through Defendant’s advertising
program.  Defendant subsequently filed the present
Motion, arguing that the Action should be transferred
in its entirety pursuant to the forum selection clause
contained in Plaintiff’s AdWords Agreement with
Defendant or, in the alternative, that Plaintiff’s
state law claims against Defendant should be dismissed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
II. Transfer of the Case Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3)
A. Legal Standard
1. FRCP 12(b)(3)
A motion to dismiss premised on the failure of a
plaintiff to initiate an action in the venue mandated
by a forum selection clause is treated as a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). 
Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, 87 F.3d 320, 324 (9th Cir.
1996).  Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. §1406(a) states that
“the district court of a district in which is filed a
case laying venue in the wrong division or district
shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district or division in which
5
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it could have been brought.”  Generally a transfer will
be in the interest of justice because the dismissal of
any case that could have been brought somewhere else is
time-consuming and justice defeating. Miller v.
Hambrick, 905 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1990).
When a party seeks enforcement of a forum selection
clause under Rule 12(b)(3), a district court is not
required to accept the pleadings as true and may
consider facts outside of the pleadings. Id.  See also
Nextrade, Inc. V. Hyosung (Am.), Inc., 122 Fed. Apx.
892, 893 (9th Cir. 2005); AF Holdings LLC v. Doe, No.
12cv1523-AJB (KSC), 2012 WL 4339072 (S.D. Cal. Sept.
20, 2012).  Furthermore, a court must draw all
reasonable inferences and resolve factual conflicts in
favor of the non-moving party.  Murphy v. Schneider
Nat’l, 362 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004).
2. Forum Selection Clauses
Federal law applies to the analysis of both the
validity and the enforcement of a forum selection
clause.  Manetti-Farrow v. Gucci Am., 858 F.2d 509, 513
(9th Cir. 1988).  “Forum selection clauses are prima
facie valid, and are enforceable absent a strong
showing by the party opposing the clause that
enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust, or that
the clause [is] invalid for such reasons as fraud or
overreaching.”  Id. at 514 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Bagdasarian Prods., LLC v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., No. 2:10-CV-02991-JHN, 2010 WL
6
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515136 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010) (holding that
enforcement “is unreasonable where it would ‘contravene
a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is
brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial
decision’”). 
B. Analysis
1. Plaintiff’s Objections
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff objects to
the Declaration of Ms. Buer, and the exhibits attached
thereto on the basis of lack of foundation and lack of
personal knowledge.  Because the Court need not rely on
Ms. Buer’s Declaration or the attached exhibits for its
analysis, Plaintiff’s objections are DENIED as moot.
Additionally, Plaintiff objects to the Supplemental
Declaration of Ms. Buer on the basis of lack of
foundation, lack of personal knowledge, and
irrelevance.  Moreover, Plaintiff objects to the
attached exhibits, which are screen shots of
Defendant’s Editorial Guidelines, last accessed on
October 9, 2012, and Defendant’s AdWords trademark
policies, last accessed on October 9, 2012.  The Court
finds that Ms. Buer’s statement about working as a
legal analyst for Defendant’s Online Legal Support,
absent additional facts, is insufficient for finding
that Ms. Buer has personal knowledge about the
guidelines or policies to which she attests or about
their application to Plaintiff’s Agreement.  See Fed.
R. Evid. 602.  Ms. Buer also fails to properly
7
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authenticate the attached exhibits pursuant to Rule
901.  Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s
objections to the Supplemental Buer Declaration and the
exhibits attached thereto.
2. Motion to Transfer
The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Transfer. 
It is clear from a plain reading of the forum selection
clause in light of Plaintiff’s Agreement that the
clause does not apply to the claims at issue here.  See
Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“Contract terms are to be given their ordinary meaning
. . . .  Whenever possible, the plain language of the
contract should be considered first. . . . We read a
written contract as a whole, and interpret each part
with reference to the whole.”)  The Agreement
explicitly “govern[s] Customer’s participation in
Google’s advertising program(s)”.  Opp’n 5:7-9
(emphasis added).  The Agreement solely addresses
Plaintiff’s participation as a customer in Defendant’s
advertising program, not Plaintiff’s rights or duties
in regard to a third party’s unlawful infringement of
its trademark. 
Defendant argues that the “Google Program(s)”
phrase will be rendered “superlative” if the Court
interprets it as covering only claims relating to
Plaintiff’s participation in the Google Program.  Reply
6:5-21.  In support of its argument, Defendant relies
on U.S. v. Hathaway, 242 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1957)
8
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and Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of the West,
442 F. Supp. 2d 914, 926 (E.D. Cal. 2006).  These cases
are not on point here because the Court is neither
disregarding the “Google Program(s)” phrase, as
addressed by the Hathaway court, nor is it reading
inconsistent or contradictory meaning into the plain
language of the clause, as addressed by the Clarendon
court.  Furthermore, this interpretation of the “Google
Program(s)” phrase does not amount to the objectionable
surplusage about which Defendant is so concerned.
Lastly, as to Defendant’s assertion that
Plaintiff’s claims relate directly to the Agreement
because of Defendant’s Editorial Guidelines and
trademark policies that are found on separate Web
pages, the Court is not persuaded.  Plaintiff’s claims
are unrelated to Defendant’s general monitoring
policies and therefore are not subject to the forum
selection clause.
Based on the aforementioned, the Court DENIES
Defendant’s request to transfer the case because the
forum selection clause in Plaintiff’s Agreement does
not apply to the claims at issue in the case.
III. Dismissal of Plaintiff’s State Law Claims
A. Legal Standard
1. FRCP 12(b)(6)
In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court
presumes all factual allegations of the complaint to be
true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of
9
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the non-moving party.  Klarfeld v. United States, 944
F.2d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1991).  A dismissal can be
based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the
lack of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable
legal theory.  Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901
F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).  “While a complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of
action’s elements will not do.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation
omitted).  Although specific facts are not necessary if
the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the
claim and the grounds upon which the claim rests, a
complaint must nevertheless “contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that a
district court should grant leave to amend a dismissed
claim, unless the court determines that the pleading
cannot possibly be cured by the allegation of other
facts.  Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.
2000).
2. Communications Decency Act
10
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The federal Communications Decency Act (“CDA”)
provides, in part: “No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(1).  The statute goes on to define “information
content provider” as “any . . . entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the
Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 
Id., § 230(f)(3).  The Ninth Circuit clarified that if
an interactive computer service provider “materially
contribut[es]” to the alleged illegal content, it is
deemed as having developed the information and acted as
an information content provider that is not entitled to
the CDA’s general immunity provision.  Fair Hous.
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Swift v.
Zynga Game Network, Inc., No. C 09-05443 SBA, 2010 WL
4569889 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2010).  An information
service provider does not become liable as an
“information content provider” merely by augmenting
online material; it must materially contribute to the
information’s “alleged unlawfulness.”  Roommates, 521
F.3d at 1168.
///
///
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B. Analysis
First addressing Plaintiff’s state law claim of
false advertising, Plaintiff alleges that both
Defendant and ContentWatch willfully and intentionally
“made untrue and misleading statements in . . . False
Ads concerning Plaintiff’s products and services.” 
Compl. ¶ 87.  However, Defendant argues that the
advertisements were created by ContentWatch alone and
not by Defendant.  Opp’n 13:20-14:3.  Because
Defendant’s entitlement to immunity under the CDA
depends on whether Defendant “developed” or materially
contributed to the content of these advertisements, it
is too early at this juncture to determine whether CDA
immunity applies.  Thus, the Court DENIES Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s eighth claim for false
advertising.  See Chang v. Wozo LLC, No. 11-10245-DJC
(D. Mass. March 28, 2012).
As to Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims of
trademark infringement, contributory infringement,
unfair competition, and unjust enrichment, Plaintiff’s
allegations do not amount to the heightened level of
“material contribution” that the Ninth Circuit requires
in order for the Court to find that Defendant is an
information content provider.  Thus, Defendant is
entitled to CDA immunity to the extent that Plaintiff’s
state law claims attempt to hold Defendant liable for
infringing content of the advertisements at issue.
///
12
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However, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims arise
from Defendant’s tortious conduct related to something
other than the content of the advertisements, CDA
immunity does not apply. See Jurin v. Google Inc., 695
F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2010); see also
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d
413, 419 (1st Cir. Feb. 23, 2007) (noting that “[a] key
limitation [of the CDA] is that immunity only applies
when the information that forms the basis for the state
law claim has been provided by ‘another information
content provider.’” (emphasis in original)).
Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts in the
Complaint to support cognizable state law claims for
trademark infringement.  See Vallavista Corp. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1136 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (finding that actions for trademark infringement
under both California law and the Lanham Act require
the same support).  To prevail on a claim of trademark
infringement, the holder of a registered trademark must
show that another person is using: (1) a reproduction,
counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a mark; (2)
without the registrant's consent; (3) in commerce; (4)
in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services;
(5) where such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause a mistake or to deceive.  15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a);
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sanlin, 846 F.2d 1175,
1178 (9th Cir. 1988).  Here, Plaintiff alleges that
13
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Defendant, without authorization from Plaintiff, sold
to third parties the right to use Plaintiff’s
CYBERsitter trademark in Defendant’s advertising
program, AdWords.  Compl. ¶ 72.  Plaintiff further
alleges that as a result of Defendant selling the right
to use Plaintiff’s trademark, consumers are likely to
mistakenly associate Plaintiff’s goods and services
with those offered by third parties.  Id. at ¶ 73. 
Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim of
trademark infringement that is not barred by CDA
immunity.
As to Plaintiff’s state law claim of contributory
infringement, California Business and Professions Code
§ 14245(a)(3) provides, in relevant part, that an
individual who “[k]nowingly facilitate[s], enable[s],
or otherwise assist[s] a person to manufacture, use,
distribute, display, or sell goods or services bearing
a reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a mark registered under [California
trademark law], without the consent of the registrant”
is subject to civil liability.  Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant, without Plaintiff’s consent, (1) encouraged
and facilitated third parties to use the CYBERsitter
trademark in paid advertisements, (2) facilitated,
encouraged, and assisted in the incorporation and
display of the CYBERsitter trademark in the text and
title of third party’s advertisements, (3) sold the
right to use the CYBERsitter trademark to third
14
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parties, (4) displayed the CYBERsitter trademark in
close proximity to third party advertisements, and (5),
displayed the CYBERsitter trademark in Defendant’s
proprietary directory in order to encourage and
facilitated the mark’s unlawful use in the AdWords
program.  Compl. ¶ 72.  Thus, Plaintiff’s claim
sufficiently alleges the facts necessary under Section
14245(a)(3) to stand as an independent claim that does
not hinge on Defendant’s alleged contribution to the
content of the injurious advertisements.
Under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”),
“unfair competition . . . [means] and include[s] any
unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice
and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading
advertising . . . .”  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 
To state a claim under the UCL, a plaintiff must plead
that (1) the defendant engaged in one of the practices
prohibited by the statute, and (2) the plaintiff
suffered actual injury in fact as a result of
defendant’s actions.  Rolling v. E*Trade Securities,
LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  In
its Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
violated Plaintiff’s trademark rights under both
federal and California law and engaged in acts of false
and deceptive advertising.  Compl. ¶ 96.  Presuming
such allegations to be true, Plaintiff has sufficiently
pled a claim for unfair competition that withstands
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss based on CDA immunity.
15
Case 2:12-cv-05293-RSWL-AJW   Document 41    Filed 10/24/12   Page 15 of 17   Page ID
 #:362
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
As to Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment,
Defendant additionally argues that it should be
dismissed on other grounds.  Mot. Part III.  Because a
determination of whether Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment
claim stands as an “independent tort” depends on the
Court’s ruling on this additional argument, the Court
will address whether Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment
claims survives this Motion in Part III.B, infra.
In sum, for the state law claims of trademark
infringement, contributory infringement, and unfair
competition, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the facts
necessary to establish Defendant’s acts as independent
torts that are not barred by CDA immunity.  Therefore,
the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss these
claims.
IV. DISMISSAL OF PLAITIFF’S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM
As noted by both parties, there is a split within
California courts regarding whether unjust enrichment
is an independent cause of action.  Compare Jogani v.
Superior Ct., 165 Cal. App. 4th 901 (2008), McKell v.
Wash. Mut., Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457 (2006), and
McBride v. Boughton, 123 Cal. App. 4th 379 (2004), with
Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal. App. 4th 723 (2000),
and First Nationwide Sav. v. Perry, 11 Cal. App. 4th
1657 (1992).  “Generally, federal courts in California
have ruled that unjust enrichment is not an independent
cause of action because it is duplicative of relief
already available under various legal doctrines.”  See
16
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Vicuna v. Alexia Foods, Inc., No. C 11-6119 PJH, slip
op. at *3 (N.D. Cal. April 27, 2012).  The Court
follows suit and GRANTS without leave to amend
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against
Defendant for unjust enrichment. 
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES
Defendant’s Motion to Transfer and Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s State Law Claims.  The Court GRANTS without
leave to amend Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim against Defendant
Google.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 24, 2012
                                   
 HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW         
Senior, U.S. District Court Judge
17
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